"I have been reading your amazing blog and listening to some of your podcasts with Carolyn. Not sure how I haven't run across your work before. Amazing stuff." (reader's comment, 10 May 2016)
Come chat with us! Download and install an IRC-client -- Hexchat is recommended -- and go to the channel #National-Socialism on the Undernet server.

31 January 2016

Misrepresentation of German bombing-victims as Jewish Holocaust-victims by the World Jewish Congress

The logo of the World Jewish Congress appears on a site called StopHolocaustDenial.org, which has a page titled "The Final Solution." On that page is a slideshow of eight images that are apparently supposed to represent the Holocaust. The only image on that page showing dead people (as of 31 January 2016) is the one that you see above.  

Update. The day after I posted this commentary, WJC replaced that image with a different image.* It is nice that they are at least able to recognize when they've been caught, but here's a screenshot as documentation of how reckless they were:

The details of this photo are such as to make a thoughtful person doubt that it shows a scene from a concentration-camp. The bodies are neither nude (as if gassed in a fake shower-room), nor clad in striped concentration-camp uniforms, but dressed in normal civilian clothes. You can see a damaged multi-storey structure in the background, suggesting that the photo may have been taken in a bombed city.

In fact the photo shows German victims of Anglo-American bombing. In 2011 The Atlantic published a collection of photos with commentary by Alan Taylor, titled "World War II: the Fall of Nazi Germany," where this same image carries the following caption:

21. A large stack of corpses is cremated in Dresden, Germany, after the British-American air attack between February 13 and 15, 1945. The bombing of Dresden has been questioned in post-war years, with critics claiming the area bombing of the historic city center (as opposed to the industrial suburbs) was not justified militarily. [Alan Taylor, The Atlantic, 9 October 2011]

You might think that a high-profile and extraordinarily well funded organization like the World Jewish Congress would not be so reckless -- indeed, that they would have highly competent experts checking everything that they do to make sure that they get it right -- but you should not be so surprised. It is commensurate with Friedrich Nietzsche's observation: Power makes stupid

So much for the pretended intellectual integrity of the Jews.

From another perspective, we can say that they do it because they get away with it. 

How can they get away with it? That is a failure on our side, mainly a failure of moral courage. Even people in what is supposed to be alternative media often shirk their duty as truth-tellers when faced with a claim promoted under the banner of the holy Jewish Holocaust.

Don't let them continue to get away with it. The Holocaust myth should be ruthlessly demolished with facts and logic whenever it makes an appearance, until Jews find that this kind of attempt at emotional manipulation does them more harm than good.

* The image that the WJC posted as a replacement shows corpses at Buchenwald. This is still deceptive, and I will explain why. This kind of image from camps captured by U.S. and British forces has been used often to promote the belief that Jews were gassed, but -- and it is an important fact that you should know -- mainstream historiography today says that nobody was gassed at Buchenwald, nor at any other of the camps that U.S. and British forces "liberated." Not at Bergen-Belsen, not at Dachau, nor any other camp in Germany or Austria. For decades now the gassing-claims have been restricted to camps in Poland. The pictures that we are customarily shown as evidence for the Holocaust  mostly show victims of a typhus-epidemic that erupted as the war was ending. 

24 January 2016

Truth versus Lie about Dr. Josef Mengele

Read it here.

23 January 2016

A Court without Law, by Heinrich Haertle -- part 8

Permissible War

From Freispruch für Deutschland by Heinrich Haertle
Translated by Hadding Scott, 2016

The attempt to construct a "peaceful world order" with such unsuitable means ran aground not only on a so-called "unjust" war but on war as such. No one yet has been able to define what is a good or a bad, a just or an "unjust" war, because victors and vanquished could never agree on this question.

Professor Jahrreiss can therefore state in summation, and this conclusion totally smashes the foundations of the indictment: 

"By 1 September 1939 the various experiments, which had been tried since the first World War with a view to replace the "anarchic world order" of classical international law by a better, a genuine, order of peace, were over, that is, to create in the community of states a general statute according to which there would be wars which are forbidden by law and others which are countenanced. These experiments, in the opinion of the major powers of the time, had failed. The greatest military powers of the earth clashed in a struggle in which they pitted their full strength against one another." [IMT transcript, 4 July 1946]

Professor Jahrreiss then, invoking all recognized authorities[1] on international law, repeats:

"... that in universal international law as at present applied, there exists no distinction as to forbidden and non-forbidden wars."

One must thus, he said, speak of the collapse of the system of collective security (what Shawcross calls "peaceful world order"). This is of the greatest significance for the indictment on "breach the peace."  Here existed difficulties that no prescriptions of any lawgiver could entirely eliminate. 

Even if there were unambiguous standards, no authority able to make a decision would be present in a dispute:

" For even if unambiguous criteria existed, who among fallible mankind would have the authority to give a decision in case of dispute? 
"We do not even possess unambiguous criteria for aggression and defense. This holds good both for the so-called political concept, which is in a way natural, and for the legal concept or concepts of aggression and defense."

One must ask oneself, he said, whether one may speak of the collapse of the so-called system of world-peace, since such a system in practice never existed. As soon as the Kellogg Pact was interpreted, such divergent constructions resulted that "no two powers were implying exactly the same thing by the treaty."

As the distinction between "just" and "unjust" war will always vary in accord with the interests of victors and vanquished, so will a consensus never be reached among the participants about who is committing aggression and who is waging a defensive war – nor about where aggression changes into defense or defense into aggression. Professor Jahrreiss thinks indeed that there has been complete agreement [only] in this:

"War in self-defense is permitted as an inalienable right to all states; without that right, sovereignty does not exist; and every state is sole judge of whether in a given case it is waging a war of self-defense."

What kind of state however would take the position that its war is not a defensive war? And where was there ever an authority that would have been able to determine when the defensive war begins or ends? What Professor Jahrreiss affirms was applicable in every case until 1939:

"No state in the world has ever been ready to accept a foreign jurisdiction over the question of whether its decisions in the ultimate questions of existence were justified or not."

Professor Jahrreiss can invoke in this connection even the very author of the "Treaty for the Renunciation of War." In a note of 25 June 1928 Kellogg assured all nine partners in negotiation:

"The right of self-defense ... is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation ... is alone competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."

As proof that the Kellogg Pact applied only to certain wars, defense-attorney Dr. Siemers likewise refers to a circular memorandum of the American Secretary of State Kellogg from 23 June 1938 in which it is still asserted:

"There is nothing in the American draft of an antiwar treaty which restricts or prejudices the right of self-defense in any manner. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implied in every treaty." [IMT transcript, 17 July 1946]

That was nothing other than the confession through stipulation of the total failure of the original plan and purpose, which would have been able to fulfill its mission only if it could have subjected every war to the penal law of a supranational legislature and executive.

Professor Jahrreiss therefore states that the friends of peace have been cruelly deceived by the interpretation that Kellogg himself gave to his treaty, What kind of practical effect was such a treaty supposed to have after all? Each of the belligerent parties could invoke these exceptions and nobody was in the position to investigate such an excuse and make a ruling on it. 

During the vote on the Kellogg Pact in the American Senate was uttered already that weighty criticism that later proved all too justified. It was called a "gigantic piece of hypocrisy," the "legalization of war," a means for the Versailles Powers to guarantee France's hegemony in Europe and Britain's dominance over the world, and a "fertile soil for all future wars." Kellogg's interpretation of the right of defense, which according to the will of the signatory states was an integral component of the treaty, necessarily canceled the treaty's practical effect, since: "What kind of war if any was then forbidden?"

In the view of the American international-law expert Philip Marshall Brown, the Kellogg Pact gave birth to the frightening monstrosity of "undeclared war."

The deeper cause of the failure ultimately lay in the fact that the treaty offered no means whatsoever for overcoming the deeper causes of wars, which of course have never been an end in themselves, rather explosions in a situation of political tensions. If the treaty was not a guide to revising great injustices between peoples that threatened a people's right to live and possibility to develop national vigor, and if the treaty was not a guide to making compensation, then this web of paragraphs could never offer a real guarantee of peace.

One treated the problem only legally and thus could not construct a political order of peace. This task Kellogg shirked, so that his treaty-work was able to have only the effect that had been feared in the American Senate: the securing of the privileges of the Versailles Powers. This Versailles "order of peace" however was loaded with the very dynamite that led to the explosion in 1939.

The government of the German Reich explicitly indicated these dangers in the note of 27 April 1928 from Foreign-Minister Stresemann to the American ambassador.

Therefore the Kellogg Pact was able neither legally nor politically to disable war as a lawful instrument of policy. It never succeeded in finding a clear and practically applicable distinction between "aggression" and "defense."

It is thereby already proven that the aggressor-state in a war receives the same rights and obligations as the aggressed: the traditional rights pertaining to war in international law.

Had the Kellogg Pact really succeeded in prohibiting war and declaring it a crime, this would necessarily have ended the neutrality of each of its signatory states. Each state thereafter would be obliged to treat as a criminal and to fight every other state that started wars. No state could remain neutral toward a belligerent.

The first great test-case, the Abyssinian War, proved precisely the opposite. It showed that no new international law had been created through Kellogg, and that the classic international law was absolutely still in effect. Switzerland declared her absolute neutrality in 1935; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, Holland, and Sweden made the same declaration on 24 July 1938. That was de jure and de facto the end of the Kellogg Pact.

Professor Jahrreiss finally affirms:

"We therefore come to the conclusion that in the actual relations between states there existed – quite a number of years prior to 1939 –no effective general ruling of international law regarding prohibited war. No such general ruling existed so far as the leading statesmen and the peoples were aware." [IMT transcript, 9 July 1946]

Fundamentally considered the Kellogg Pact was the totally ill-fated attempt indeed still to arrive at the guarantee of peace intended with the League of Nations and in the subsequent treaty-efforts. Germany was already not obligated by these efforts because it had withdrawn from the League of Nations and abrogated the Locarno Pact, which in 1934 had been extended for five years and was not extended by any of the signatory states after this term had run its course. Only the Kellogg Pact had not been abrogated, and indeed for the simple reason that politically it no longer existed. It had died from the fact that it wanted to make a distinction between aggressive and defensive war, and therewith left it to each signatory power to allow defensive war for itself.

The famous English historian and jurist F.J.P. Veale therefore states that the much prized distinction between aggressive and defensive war belongs to the greatest lie and deception that the international semantics of modernity has bestowed upon us. The American professor H. W. Lawrence already on the 10th of October 1934 in the periodical Christian Century indicated that with this restriction one only provided for oneself a fabricated moral alibi for securing the privileges of the affluent nations.

The American historian Harry Elmer Barnes in his book History of Western Civilization designates the formal distinction between aggressive and defensive war as "the saddest and greatest monument to the foolishness of those who adhere to formulae."

Since there were no special punishments for violations of the treaty, in other words since no arrangements for the implementations of punishments were envisaged, the pact remained an abstraction that could not be applied to any concrete historical case: "It is quite clear," writes Veale, "that every sharpwitted diplomat was capable of justifying almost any conceivable war under the sanction of one or the other of these excepted categories."

The important American international-law expert Professor Edwin M. Borchard of Yale University declared before the college of politics in Williamstown, already during the signing, that the pact was worthless for keeping war contained. Instead, he said, for the first time in the history of humanity it silently invited the moral forces of the world to approve all wars that would eventuate.
[1]. According to the official English-language transcript, Jahrreiss did not quite say "all" but rather: "the majority of international lawyers throughout the world."

19 January 2016

Holocaust = House of Cards

In my essay "Our Weapon: The Truth", published on The Occidental Observer in December 2011, I said this:

The fact that somebody expresses a forbidden thought, and forces the system and the public to tolerate it, is already a victory that puts the system into a defensive posture.

Essentially the same idea had been stated by  Milovan Mracevich in this final paragraph from an article about "Holocaust Denial" that appeared in 1984 in The Montreal Gazette:

Many Jews fear that revisionist propaganda may eventually succeed in denigrating the central fact of the Holocaust, namely the murder of millions of Jews in gas chambers, from an absolute historical truth into a subject of debate. If a sizable portion of the public ever begins even to question the genocide as having occurred, the revisionists will, in a large sense, have already won. [M. Mracevich, "'Holocaust-Denial Movement' Steps Up Attack" The Montreal Gazette, 1 March 1984]

The problem that the Holocaustian establishment has is that if they engage the revisionists, they will lose the argument because the facts are on the revisionist side, and if they are seen forcibly stifling expressions of revisionism, they will lose moral status and credibility by abandoning the pretense of being truly liberal and committed to fairness. Either way, discussing or refusing to discuss, they lose -- if only someone raises the question.

Another point that I made in my essay "Our Weapon: The Truth" was that the success of a publicity-campaign should not be measured by the number of people willing to stand up and publicly agree. Most of the people influenced by such a campaign will not be willing to do that. 

Disbelief toward the Jewish Holocaust story may not always be expressed as disbelief, since we all know that lack of faith here is strongly disapproved. We are all familiar with the concept of avoiding trouble by not saying exactly what we really think. Private doubt about the Holocaust may come out as impatience with having to hear about the Holocaust yet again, or as criticisms of how the Holocaust story is used, often introduced by a concatenation like, "I am not a Holocaust-Denier but ... "

The paucity of overt expressions of outright support for revisionism therefore should not be taken as a sign of failure. On the contrary, merely having Holocaust-skepticism accepted as an opinion to which one is entitled is an enormous success. That is what Milovan Mracevich told us in 1984.

Anyone who says that revisionism has had no impact is willfully blind. Jews are no longer securely established on the pedestal that they occupied a few decades ago, and widespread doubt about their Holocaust story  is certainly a large part of the reason for that change.

The Holocaust and the rest of the Jewish mythology that we are all expected to endorse is a mere house of cards just waiting to be knocked down.  

07 January 2016

A Court without Law, by Heinrich Haertle -- part 7

I have replaced Haertle's lengthy paraphrases of Hermann Jahrreiss' statements before the IMT with direct quotes, where the indirect discourse written by Haertle closely matches what the official transcript of 4 July 1946 records Jahrreiss as saying. Where I saw a significant difference, I noted it. Where I could improve significantly in style or clarity on the IMT's official rendering of what Jahrreiss said, I did so.

Key points of this section are: (1) that the victors were totally outclassed by the German defense-team, especially Professor Hermann Jahrreiss, in knowledge of international law; (2) while the International Military Tribunal's charter was supposed to be based on international law, no examination of the validity of that claim was allowed; (3) the IMT's charter is clearly ex post facto law and therefore invalid; (4) the IMT's charter presupposes a pre-existing peaceful world-order of "collective security" under the League of Nations that was well known to have been defunct long before the defendants are supposed to have shattered it.

Nice idea, but it didn't work.

The Pleading of a Legal Scholar

From Freispruch für Deutschland by Heinrich Haertle
Translated by Hadding Scott, 2016

It would be a waste of time to refute the flimsy excuses whereby one would like to justify this kind of arbitrary lawgiving. Here the old arguments are only rigidly repeated, because no one, neither among the judges nor among the prosecutors, is able to come forth to argue on the same level with the German defense-team.

That was especially evident in the clumsy attempts to respond to the argument about international law that Professor Jahrreiss, assistant defender for Senior-General Jodl, made on behalf of the whole defense. Professor Jahrreiss, the famous philosopher of law and expert on international law, holder of the Great Federal Cross of Merit (des Grossen Bundesverdienstkreuzes) since 1959, and officer of the Legion of Honor since 1961, demonstrates impressively that the German defense-team stands far above the Allied judges' and prosecutors' level of legal scholarship.

Because of the tribunal's refusal on 21 November 1945 to allow the legal foundations of its charter to be reviewed in terms of international law, as Dr. Stahmer had requested, the pleading of Dr. Jahrreiss is anticipated with all the more suspense.  After the experiences with Dr. Stahmer's petition, Jahrreiss formulates his presentation with utmost prudence, while retreating not even one step from his jurisprudential position.

He refers first to the contradiction between the judges and prosecutors, because they constantly take pains to cloak their proceedings with arguments about international law, but at the same time prevent the defense from testing and refuting those pretenses about international law. 

"The Charter threatens individuals with punishment for breaches of the peace between states. It would appear that the Tribunal is accepting the Charter as the unchallengeable foundation for all juridical considerations. This means that the Tribunal will not examine the question of whether the Charter, as a whole or in parts, is open to juridical objections; yet such a question nevertheless continues to exist. If this is so, why, then, have any discussion at all on the main fundamental legal problems?

"The British chief prosecutor even made an examination of the relationship of the Charter ... to existing international law into the central theme of his long address."

Presumably the British chief prosecutor had to try to maintain at least the appearance of justice before the British public.

Professor Jahrreiss affirms again however that there is a crime only where there is a violation of pre-existing laws. Only then, he said, can someone be conscious of the illegality of his action. Without this consciousness no defendant may be pronounced guilty –  at least not from the point of view of the European continental conception of penal law.

"The British chief prosecutor argues as follows, if I understood him correctly:

"First, the unrestricted right of states to wage war was abolished in part by the League of Nations Covenant, later as a general principle by the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which continues to be the nucleus of world peace order to this very day. War, thus prohibited, is a punishable violation of law within and toward the community of nations, and any individual who has acted in a responsible capacity is punishable. 
"Secondly, the indictment of individuals for breach of the peace, although novel, not only represents a moral necessity, but is in fact long overdue in the evolution of law; it is quite simply the logical result of the new legal position. Only in outward appearance does the Charter create new law."

Step by step Professor Jahrreiss demolishes these seemingly so plausible arguments. He can demonstrate without difficulty that the actual historical development in every particular instance proves the opposite of what the chief prosecutor presents as irrefutable certainty. If the historical experiences offered by the decades since the Second World War had been at Dr. Jahrreiss' disposal, his verdict on these pretenses of international law would have turned out even more devastating.

As after the First World War, so too after 1945 one had applied all possible attempts to restrain by means of paragraphs the old god of war, Mars, who has degenerated more and more into a blood-drenched demon.

The League was already seen as a failure in 1923.
The outcome is even more negative than in the period between 1919 and 1939. The intention that already formed the basis of the charter of the League of Nations, to guarantee "eternal peace" juristically, failed after the catastrophe of 1945 even faster than the direst skeptics had feared. The arms-race and wars did not cease: in the last decades has reigned only a strife between the armistices. Nothing can show more clearly that the Nuremberg Tribunal, if it ever sincerely strove for a new world order of peace, has failed entirely.

Professor Jahrreiss explicitly professes the highest ethical aim, to prepare, instead of the sham-peace that hitherto dissolved the armistice, a real world-peace that then could also subject the breakers of the peace to an internationally valid criminal law. Indeed he also names the conditions that would have to be fulfilled to arrive at such an ideal situation:

"The tragic chain of wars and mere armistices termed peace must be broken. Sometime humanity must have the insight and the will to pass from war to real peace, that is, to peace which is good in its essence, founded on existing legal principles, without regard to victory or defeat;  and this peace, which is good in its essence, must be maintained – and maintained in good condition – by an organized union of states.[1]  These aims can only be achieved if the most frequent causes of war are eliminated, namely excessive armaments, secret treaties, and the consecration – detrimental to life – of the status quo as a result of lack of insight on the part of the possessor of the moment.

"Humanity did not follow this path. And one should not be amazed that among those who fought against the instruments of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Sèvres, be it in the camp of the vanquished or in that of the victors, were the very ones who strove after real, lasting peace."

Guilty in this development, he said, are precisely those powers whose representatives appear again today as prosecutors against Germany. Jahrreiss affirms:

"Even for the members of the League of Nations war remained a means for settling disputes, prohibited in individual cases, but normal on the whole. Jean Ray, as late as 1930, said: 'The League of Nations did not prove to be a guide to the true order of peace, indeed it did not even prove to be a sufficient brake to prevent a complete backward movement into the former state. For the world did in fact slide back entirely'."[2]

Again Professor Jahrreiss underscores this fact that is crucial to the foundation of this process:

"Before the commencement of the second World War the whole system of collective security, even in such scanty beginnings as it had made, had collapsed; and this collapse was acknowledged and declared expressly, or by equivalent action, by three world powers – and, in fact, declared with full justification."

Professor Jahrreiss names in that connection Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the USA, and demonstrates this through historical examples. That was thus in reality what was left over of the "peaceful world-order" that Shawcross had made the premise of his indictment.

"It is certain that the above-mentioned three world-powers testified at the beginning of September 1939 to the collapse – the complete collapse – and that they did not, in fact, do so as a consequence of the German-Polish war." 

Even such a prominent jurist of international law as the American Edwin Borchard asserted in 1938, thus a year before the outbreak of war, that the so-called peace-system constructed in Versailles appeared "absolutely inimical to peace, and the offspring of the hysteria of our age."[3]
]1] There is a big difference here between the English-language transcript of what Jahrreiss said and what Haertle says that Jahrreiss said in German. In Haertle's account Jahrreiss made no reference to a union of nations but said: "This however is not primarily a legal but a political task."

[2] Jean Ray, Commentaire du Pacte de la Societe des Nations selon la Politique et la Jurisprudence des Organes de la Societe, Recueil Sirey (Paris), 1930.

[3] Edwin Borchard was a professor at Yale Law School. The quote that Haertle gives is not Borchard but Jahrreiss summarizing Borchard. The reference seems to be to Borchard's essay, "Neutrality" dated 1 January 1938. Borchard said: "This system was pictured as the 'new' international law; hence all the old law that conflicted with the ideal had to be attacked as obsolete if not indeed obstructive. Neutrality, a hard-won institution which since the 16th century had served to keep a large part of the world at peace under the regulation of law, an institution which peacemakers had cherished as one of the most constructive achievements of a slowly developing civilization, fell under the ban of the 'new' school of peace through combined force. And so effectively did this false theory help to prevent the rebirth of the process of appeasement that the world now stands aghast before the new disasters which threaten. In a less hysterical age, the 'new' theory could not have gained so many adherents." (Yale Law Journal, vol. 48: 37. 1938, p. 39)